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Taming "Instrumentality":The FCPA's
Legislative History Requires Proof of
Government Control
Stephen Hagenbucht

INTRODUCTION

In 1977, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)1 was enacted primarily to prevent US companies from bribing foreign
government officials in order to obtain or maintain business with
the foreign government. 2 The FCPA applies to businesses that
issue stock in US markets, are based in the US, or commit an act
in furtherance of an FCPA violation while in the US. 3 Five elements relevant to this Comment comprise the FCPA antibribery
provisions: 1) "corruptly" 2) paying or attempting to pay 3) "anything of value" 4) to a "foreign official" 5) in order to assist the
company in retaining or obtaining business. 4
This Comment challenges how some courts have interpreted
the term "foreign official." The FCPA defines a foreign official as
"any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any person acting in an official capacity
for or on behalf of any such [entity]." 5
Legislative hearings leading to the passage of the FCPA noted a number of "questionable" business practices abroad, including bribery of officials employed by foreign governments, donations to political parties, and bribery of employees of private cor-

t BA 2007, Haverford College; JD Candidate 2013, The University of Chicago Law
School.
1 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), Pub L No 95-213, 91 Stat 1494,
codified at 15 USC §§ 78dd-1 et seq.
2 See note 27 and accompanying text. The FCPA also contains a books-and-records
provision.
3 See 15 USC §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a). The statute uses the term "domestic
concerns" to refer to US businesses. See 15 USC § 78dd-2(h)(1)(B).
4 15 USC § 78dd-2(a)(1).
5 15 USC § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
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porations. 6 Though legislators knew companies were bribing employees of private corporations, the FCPA's drafters did not outlaw such payments; instead, they decided to criminalize payments only when the recipient has some connection to the public
sector.7 As enacted, the FCPA therefore only criminalizes bribes
to "any foreign official"; "any foreign political party or official
thereof or any candidate for foreign political office"; or to "any
person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or
thing of value will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly" to the previously listed entities.8
Prosecutors have advanced problematic interpretations of
"instrumentality" when they allege that employees of corporations similar to a governmental agency or department are "foreign officials" under the FCPA. The Department of Justice (DOJ)
has prosecuted cases of bribery of officials of foreign governmentowned and foreign government-sponsored corporations (hereinafter "government-influenced corporations"). 9 Yet courts have not
developed a coherent framework to determine when governmentinfluenced corporations should fall under the FCPA's prohibition
on bribery of a foreign government "instrumentality," primarily
because most lawsuits end in settlements, not litigation. 10 Indeed, the uncertainty has spawned efforts for congressional clarification of the law;11 because many FCPA suits are settled out of
court, critics argue that the term "instrumentality" lets the federal government enforce the FCPA broadly and punish payments
to entities that fall far outside of the usual understanding of a
government employee. 12 One commentator has argued that this
6 See, for example, Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 28-31 (1977) (statement of Dr. Gordon Adams) ("1977 Consumer Protection Hearings").
7 See 15 USC § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A).
8 15 USC § 78dd-2(a)(1)-(3).
9 See Andrew Weissmann and Alixandra Smith, Restoring Balance: Proposed
Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 25-27 (US Chamber Institute for Legal
Reform 2010), online at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/sites/default/files/restorin
gbalance fcpa.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012).
10 See Joel M. Cohen, Michael P. Holland, and Adam P. Wolf, Under the FCPA, Who
Is a ForeignOfficial Anyway?, 63 Bus Law 1243, 1245-46 (2008).
11 See, for example, Dan Froomkin, U.S. Chamber Of Commerce Battles Anti-Bribery
Statute (Huffington Post Aug 12, 2011), online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08
/12/chamber-of-commerce-foreign-corrupt-practices-act n_919617.html (visited Sept 10,
2012).
12 See Weissmann and Smith, Restoring Balance at 24-27 (cited in note 9). See also
id at 25 ('The government's expansive interpretation of 'instrumentality' has not yet been
tested in the courts and is unlikely to be tested in the near future.").
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vague definition has harmed US competitiveness: "Because of the
prevailing view that the FCPA's antibribery provisions are too
vague and ambiguous, American companies have foregone legitimate business opportunities abroad rather than risk violating
the Act." 13
Despite one court's assertion that the definition of "instrumentality" is "clear,"14 the FCPA's use of the word "instrumentality" is ambiguous because it lacks sufficient guidance for its application, especially compared to the statute's use of "department, agency, or . . . public international organization."15 This
Comment will lay out why the term is ambiguous and explain
how the legislative history provides a principled distinction between government-influenced entities and fully privatized companies-one that narrows the expansive interpretation adopted
by the DOJ and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). 16
In Part I of this Comment, I examine the legislative history
of key FCPA provisions and the current controversy over the
government's assertion that certain entities fall within the
FCPA's purview. In Part II, I argue that legislative history is key
to defining "instrumentality" and that Congress's failure to outlaw private bribery is instructive to defining the term. In Part
III, I argue that courts should use a "control analysis" centering
on the degree of government control over the "instrumentality." I
also argue that courts and commentators have in part relied on
mistaken factors in determining whether entities fall under the
FCPA's purview.
I. BACKGROUND
In this Part, I use legislative history to explain the FCPA's
distinction between a foreign official and a private corporation
official. I also use this history to explore the distinction between
a "grease payment," used to speed up foreign governmental action, and a "corrupt" bribe. I then examine how courts have recently defined "instrumentality."

13 Laura E. Longobardi, Reviewing the Situation: What Is to Be Done with the Foreign
Corrupt PracticesAct?, 20 Vand J Transnatl L 431, 494 (1987).
14 United States v Carson, 2011 WL 5101701, *8 (CD Cal).
15 15 USC § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A).
16 See Weissmann and Smith, Restoring Balance at 24-27 (cited in note 9).
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The FCPA's Purpose
1. By permitting private corporation bribery, the FCPA targets improper influence on a foreign government.

When the FPCA was drafted, Congress was quite aware that
US companies made payments to foreign private corporations in
order to secure business." Congress held hearings following revelations of improper bribes that domestic corporations had made
abroad in the mid-1970s. 8 Legislators heard testimony, for example, that Honeywell paid $800,000 from 1971 to 1975 to employees of "private customers." 19 Other practices included overbilling and rebating to foreign private corporations and making
payments to senior employees in a corporation in order to secure
contracts.20
Testimony at these congressional hearings noted explicitly
that the proposed legislation would not cover such payments.
During one hearing, a witness from a public interest research
organization stated:
[T]he bill also does not deal with overseas business practices: payments, kickbacks, rebates involving private foreign customers and businesses. [The Council on Economic
Priorities] found this practice to be equally common, and
conceivably equally injurious to the reputation of American business abroad.21
In addition, a 1976 SEC report to a Senate committee that
spurred development of the FCPA distinguished the two types of
payments, noting a difference between "recipients ...

[who are]

government officials" and "recipients of commercial bribery." 22 In
both the House and Senate, therefore, the FCPA's supporters

17 See 1977 Consumer ProtectionHearings, 95th Cong, 1st Sess at 30 (cited in note 6)
("Another type of questionable commercial payment involves gifts and payments to employees of foreign customers, to obtain business or to celebrate a successful commercial
relationship.").
18 See id at 1 (statement of Congressman Eckhardt).
19 Id at 30 (statement of Dr. Gordon Adams).
20 See id.

21 1977 Consumer Protection Hearings, 95th Cong, 1st Sess at 36 (cited in note 6)
(statement of Dr. Gordon Adams) (emphasis added).
22 Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on Questionable and Illegal
Corporate Payments and Practices to the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Committee, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 25 (1976). See also id at 29 ('The Commission also has
observed payments made to improperly influence a non-governmental customer[].").
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were aware that companies had also given bribes to private institutions and, crucially, that these bribes could also harm America's reputation abroad. But the drafters did not outlaw these
bribes in the FCPA.23
By permitting bribery of private officials, Congress signaled
that the FCPA's primary goal is eliminating improper influence
on foreign governments. Congressman Bob Eckhardt, a key proponent of the FCPA's House version, said during a House hearing that bribes to foreign officials were unethical and "bad business" because they distorted the free market by allocating business to those who could not compete on price and quality alone. 24
But this concern exists for bribes to private corporations as well,
so an intent to target unethical "bad business" does not explain
the difference in payments to foreign officials and private officials. Congressman Eckhardt, though, did note that "[b]ribery to
foreign officials . .. creates severe foreign policy problems" for

America, 25 including "diplomatic problems," a tarnished image of
America abroad, and damage to "the legal, political, and economic order of friendly host governments." 26 This second set of concerns can explain the FCPA's focus on public, not private, bribery--outlawing public bribery addresses the effect on the foreign
government vastly more than outlawing private bribery. The
public/private bribery distinction appears primarily intended,
therefore, to further the goal of eliminating improper influence
on the operation of the foreign government itself.27
2. The "grease payment" exception targets improper influence on a foreign government.
Although the FCPA bans most payments to foreign officials,
it permits "grease payments," also known as facilitating pay-

23 See Part IIB. Congress did not address private corporation bribery in the two subsequent revisions of the law in 1988 and 1998.
2
1977 Consumer Protection Hearings, 95th Cong, 1st Sess at 2 (cited in note 6)
(statement of Congressman Eckhardt).
25 Id.

26 Id (quotation marks omitted). See also Report on the Unlawful CorporatePayments
Act of 1977, HR Rep No 95-640, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 5 (1977) (discussing how improper
payments "lend credence to the suspicions sown by foreign opponents of the United States
that American enterprises exert a corrupting influence on the political processes of their
nations").
27 See Lamb v Phillip Morris, Inc, 915 F2d 1024, 1029 (6th Cir 1990) ("[T]he FCPA
was primarily designed to protect the integrity of American foreign policy and domestic
markets.") (emphasis added).
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ments. 28 The FCPA as enacted in 1977 also permitted payments
to employees whose duties were solely "ministerial or clerical." 29
However, Congress amended this ministerial/clerical provision in
1988 to outlaw payments to foreign officials that did not fall
within certain stated exceptions, including the new grease payment exception. 30 The sponsors of the 1988 amendment clarified
that the distinction should not be about who received the payment, but about "the purpose of the payment."3 1 The 1988 grease
payments exception was meant to reinforce the 1977 congressional intent concerning ministerial/clerical employee payments. 32 Therefore, the legislative history from 1977 remains
useful in understanding the grease payments exception. 33
Legislative history indicates the ministerial/clerical exception applied to payments that "merely move a particular matter
toward an eventual act or decision or which do not involve any
discretionary action."34 The exception was meant for actions "ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official" including,
but not limited to, obtaining business licenses, governmental papers, police protection, mail, inspections, phone service, power,
water, and protection of physical goods. 35 Congressman Eckhardt's statements at a 1977 congressional hearing further illuminate the congressional intent behind this exception. He envi28 The exception reads: "[The FCPA] shall not apply to any facilitating or expediting
payment to a foreign official, political party, or party official the purpose of which is to
expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action by a foreign official, political party, or party official." 15 USC § 78dd-2(b). However, the FCPA does apply
to bribery in relation to
any decision by a foreign official whether, or on what terms, to award new business to or to continue business with a particular party, or any action taken by a
foreign official involved in the decision-making process to encourage a decision
to award new business to or continue business with a particular party.
15 USC § 78dd-2(h)(4)(B).
29 See FCPA § 103(a), 91 Stat at 1495. See also Arthur F. Mathews, Defending SEC
and DOJ FCPA Investigations and Conducting Related Corporate FCPA Investigations:
The Triton Energy/IndonesiaSEC Consent Decree Settlements, 18 Nw J Intl L & Bus 303,
330 (1998).
30 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Title V ("Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Amendments of 1988") § 5003, Pub L No 100-418, 102 Stat 1107, 1415. See
also Mathews, 18 Nw J Intl L & Bus at 331.
31 Report on Trade and International Economic Policy Reform Act of 1987, HR Rep
No 100-40 Pt 2, 100th Cong, 1st Sess 77 (1987) (emphasis added).
32 See id.

3 See, for example, United States v Kay, 359 F3d 738, 747 nn 31 & 32 (5th Cir 2004)
(looking to the legislative history of the 1977 FCPA enactment to explain the meaning of
the grease payment exception as it exists now).
34 HR Rep No 95-640 at 8 (cited in note 26).
3 15 USC § 78dd-2(h)(4)(A).
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sioned a hypothetical businessman giving a "tip" to a low-level
bureaucrat in order to "spur up" the official's transmission of a
bid application to higher-level officials. 36 Congressman Eckhardt
stated that this action would not be "giving a thing of value for
the purpose of getting an official to influence his government."37
Such giving of a "tip" would be permitted under the House
bill because the bill required proof of "corrupt intent," defined as
"something more than merely [actions] to put into effect the
normal channels of operation or to open the sluices of bureaucracy." 38 The House committee report on the FCPA stated that the
FCPA was meant to outlaw "payments which cause an official to
exercise other than his free will in acting or deciding or influencing an act or decision." 39 The FCPA was intended to apply to
payments "made to influence the passage of law, regulations, the
placement of government contracts, the formulation of policy or
other discretionary governmental functions." 40 And the report
further clarified that "payments which merely move a particular
matter toward an eventual act or decision or which do not involve any discretionary action" would remain legal. 4 1
The 1988 amendment reinforced this focus on discretionary
government action. The 1988 House committee report stated that
when a court determined whether a payment should fall within
the grease payment exception,
it may determine that a payment which is unusually large
in relation to the "governmental action" performed may
not fall within this [grease payment] defense. It may also
consider whether the foreign official receiving the payment is in a position to influence substantially the question of whether, or on what terms, to award new business
to or continue business . . . or to influence legislative, judicial, regulatory, or other action.42
The 1988 amendment, then, outlawed payments to clerical
employees who were senior enough to influence an official with

36
37
38
3
40
41
42

1977 Consumer Protection Hearings,95th Cong, 1st Sess at 51 (cited in note 6).
Id (emphasis added).
Id at 52.
HR Rep No 95-640 at 8 (cited in note 26).
Id (emphasis added).
Id.
HR Rep No 100-40 Pt 2 at 77 (cited in note 31) (emphasis added).
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discretionary power. 43 This change reinforced the FCPA's functional approach, which was to target bribes meant to influence
discretionary governmental activities.
While judicial commentary on the grease payment exception

is sparse, 44 in United States v Kay4 5 the Fifth Circuit explored
the exception in a case involving bribes to Haitian customs officials to lower a company's taxes and customs duties. 46 The court
held that such payments did not fall under the grease payment
exception and interpreted the exception as meaning that "Congress sought to prohibit the type of bribery that (1) prompts officials to misuse their discretionary authority and (2) disrupts
market efficiency and United States foreign relations, at the
same time recognizing that smaller payments intended to expedite ministerial actions should remain outside of the scope of the
statute."47
The Kay court interpreted the 1977 legislative history as intending to outlaw "payments that are intended to influence nontrivial official foreign action in an effort to aid in obtaining or
retaining business for some person."48 The court also noted that
Congress's intent was to target "bribery that ... prompts officials
to misuse their discretionary authority." 49
The Kay court's interpretation of the legislative history of
the grease payment exception supports the conclusion that a
payment is not illegal if it influences only a low-level paperpusher. The payment must instead influence an official who
wields discretionary power, and that power must be part of a
governmental institution.
B.

Courts Confront the Definition of "Instrumentality"

Although the Fifth Circuit in Kay used legislative history in
its analysis of the grease payment exception, district courts have
been reluctant to do the same in interpreting the word "instrumentality."50 Most have relied on what they consider a plain
meaning of the statutory text.
43 See id.

4 A recent search on WestlawNext indicates that fewer than fifteen cases have cited
to the "grease payments" portion of the FCPA.
4 359 F3d 738 (5th Cir 2004).
46 See id at 740.
17 Id at 747 (emphasis added).
48 Id at 749-50 (emphasis added).
49 Kay, 359 F3d at 747.
5o See, for example, United States v Esquenazi, 2010 US Dist LEXIS 143572, *4-5
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One district court has advanced a broad test for whether an
entity fits under the term "instrumentality." United States v
Aguilar 1 held that employees of the Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE) in Mexico are employees of an FCPA "instrumentality." The CFE was created in 1975 and is defined under Mexican law as a "decentralized public entity with legal personality
and its own patrimony."52 The DOJ argued that the CFE was a
"state-owned" utility, entity, and enterprise, and a "government
instrumentality."53 The DOJ also stated that the Mexican Constitution provides that the supply of electricity is solely a government function. 54
The court held that the CFE had a number of characteristics
that were similar to the sine qua non of agencies and departments. The court cautioned that its list was "non-exclusive," but
the factors it noted meant that the CFE was considered an instrumentality.5 5 The factors the court listed were the following:
1) the CFE provides a service to citizens, and often all inhabitants, of an area; 2) the government appoints key officers and directors; 3) the CFE is financed largely through government appropriations or government-required taxes or fees; 4) the CFE
has exclusive power to administer its functions; and 5) the CFE
is "widely perceived and understood to be performing official (i.e.,
governmental) functions."5 6
The court canvassed the relationship of the FCPA to the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)
anticorruption treaty ratified in 1998, as well as the legislative
history of the FCPA, but found both inconclusive concerning the
meaning of instrumentality.5 7 It then concluded that, based on a
hypothetical similar to the underlying facts, "members of Congress would not deem such a prosecution to be beyond the purview of the FCPA" simply because the entity was a "corporation."5 8

(SD Fla). As of now, only district courts have weighed in on the types of entities that fall
under the FCPA's definition of'instrumentality."
51 783 F Supp 2d 1108 (CD Cal 2011).
52 Id at 1112 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
53 Id at 1120.
5 Id at 1112.
55 Aguilar, 783 F Supp 2d at 1115.
56 Id.

57 See id at 1117-19.
58 Id at 1120.
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The court rejected the defendant's argument that "instrumentality" meant such things as branches of government and
that no corporation could fall into the definition of a government
instrumentality.5 9 The defendants argued that only corporations
with the characteristics that were the "sine qua non of both
agencies and departments" could qualify as instrumentalities.6 0
The government argued instead that government-influenced
corporations share "various qualities" with government entities,
"such as existing at the pleasure of the government and being
oriented to public policy." 61 The government argued that the
term "instrumentality" could not have precisely the same characteristics as either departments or agencies, or else the word "instrumentality" in the statute would make it surplusage. 62 Ultimately, the Court agreed with the government.
Two other district courts that have interpreted "instrumentality" have held that the term was unambiguous and thus did
not warrant an examination of the legislative history. In United
States v Esquenazi,63 the court rejected a motion to dismiss based
on the FCPA's "instrumentality" clause. The court held, succinctly, that "[t]he plain language of this statute and the plain meaning of this term" show that a state-owned company, Haiti Teleco,
could be an instrumentality under the FCPA. 64 The court also
held that the definition of "foreign official" was not unconstitutionally vague, as individuals of common intelligence would have
fair notice of what the statute prohibited.6 5
The fullest discussion of "instrumentality," and the one closest to what this Comment argues is the correct interpretation,
appears in United States v Carson.66 Carson held that the term
should be given its "ordinary meaning" and cited dictionary definitions of the term.6 7 The court concluded that the FCPA's language was "clear," that the statute's scheme was "coherent and

59 Aguilar, 783 F Supp 2d at 1113 ("[T]he dispositive question [defendants] pose is
purely legal: whether any entity's status as a state-owned corporation-of any kind, with
any characteristics-disqualifies it as an entity properly addressed by an FCPA indictment.") (quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
60 Id.
61 Id at 1114.
62 Id.
63 2010 US Dist LEXIS 143572 (SD Fla).
64 Id at *4-5.
65 Id at *5.

66 2011 WL 5101701 (CD Cal).
67 Id at *4.
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consistent," and that the legislative history was therefore irrelevant. 68
The court in Carson based its analysis of the term on dictionary definitions of "instrumentality," and formulated the rule
that "instrumentality" means "something that is used to achieve
an end-an intermediary or means through which something is
accomplished." 69 It relied on definitions of instrumentality that
included "a condition of serving as an intermediary," "something
by which an end is achieved," and "the fact or function of serving
or being used for the accomplishment of some purpose or end." 0
It also noted that the word instrumentality was used in statutes
such as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)nI to include state-owned companies, and it concluded that the term
"was intended to capture entities that are not 'departments' or
'agencies' of a foreign government, but nevertheless carry out
governmental functions or objectives." 72 Nonetheless, the court
explained that a government's monetary investment in a company could make that entity an "instrumentality" if such investment was "combined with additional factors that objectively indicate the entity is being used as an instrument to carry out governmental objectives." 73
The court in Carson reasoned that the following six factors
should be relevant to determining whether a corporation would
be considered an instrumentality, although no factor should be
dispositive: 1) the nation's "characterization of the entity and its
employees"; 2) the nation's "degree of control over the entity"; 3)
the "purpose of the entity's activities"; 4) its "obligations and
privileges," such as whether it has exclusive power to administer
its designated functions; 5) the circumstances of its creation; and
6) the nation's "extent of ownership of the entity, including the
level of financial support by the state (e.g., subsidies, special tax
treatment, and loans)." 74 In its discussion of the sixth factor, the
Carson court noted that the "extent" of government ownership
was a relevant factor and stated that government investment by
itself might not suffice to fulfill the instrumentality characteriza-

68

Id

at *8.

69 Id at *4 (citations omitted).
70 Carson, 2011 WL 5101701 at *4 (citations omitted).
71 The FSIA is codified at 28 USC §§ 1602-11.
72 Carson, 2011 WL 5101701 at *5.

73 Id.
74 Id at *3-4.
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tion. 75 But, the court explained, "when a monetary investment is
combined with additional factors that objectively indicate the
entity is being used as an instrument to carry out governmental
objectives," that entity is an instrumentality. 6 The court concluded that "instrumentality" only referred to entities that "carry
out governmental functions or objectives." 7
Carson did not apply this test to the facts of the case, which
involved payments to state-owned companies in countries including China. Rather, it held that whether an entity was an instrumentality depended on the facts and could not be decided as a
matter of law; therefore, the district court could not decide this
question on a motion to dismiss the indictment. 8 Likewise, the
court in Esquenazi held that the defendants could bring up their
contentions at trial; the court could not determine whether the
entity was an "instrumentality" as a matter of law. 7 9
II. THE "INSTRUMENTALITY" AMBIGUITY INVITES INTERPRETING
COURTS TO CONSIDER LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In contrast to what district courts have stated, this Comment argues that "instrumentality" as used in the FCPA is ambiguous, both compared to the use of other terms in the FCPA
and to how "instrumentality" is defined in other statutes. This
Part lays out Supreme Court precedent for the use of legislative
history and argues that legislative history on the private/public
official distinction provides meaningful guidance for interpreting
the FCPA term "instrumentality."
A.

The Ambiguity of "Instrumentality" in the FCPA

The FCPA applies to payments given to employees of three
other types of entities, the definitions of which are significantly
less ambiguous than "instrumentality." The FCPA outlaws
bribes to an official of a foreign governmental "department" and
"agency." Both terms have straightforward definitions as administrative divisions of a foreign government's power.8 0 The FCPA
outlaws bribes to members of a "public international organiza-

75 Id at *5.
76 Carson, 2011 WL 5101701 at *5.

7 Id.
78 Id at *3.

79 Esquenazi, 2010 US Dist LEXIS 143572 at *4.
8o 15 USC § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A).
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tion." While not clear on its face, the term is defined as an entity
that the president has declared to be a public international organization.8 1 But the FCPA contains no further definition of "instrumentality." The Carson court's holding that "instrumentality" means "something that is used to achieve an end-an intermediary or means through which something is accomplished" 82 is
plausible, but as this Comment shows, this interpretation fails to
focus on the discretionary government power that the FCPA emphasizes.
The FCPA's language also appears ambiguous when compared to FSIA, which more clearly lays out when an entity is
considered an "instrumentality" of a state. The FSIA is like the
FCPA in that the application of a US law depends in large part
on the legal relationship that a foreign entity has to a foreign
nation's government. However, the FSIA states that "agency or
instrumentality" refers only to an "organ" of a foreign state or an
entity "a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof."83 The
FSIA thus lays out a relatively clear test for when it would apply
to a foreign "instrumentality."
1. Legislative history can be used to interpret ambiguous
phrases such as "instrumentality."
The Supreme Court has held that "[w]hen the words of a
84
statute are unambiguous, . . . judicial inquiry is complete."

Statutory text is the most important source for courts to consult
when interpreting a statute. 85 However, "[1]egislative history can
be a legitimate guide to a statutory purpose obscured by ambiguity."86
A court may refuse to consult legislative history, but this
generally occurs when statutes provide more guidance than the
81 15 USC § 78dd-2(h)(2)(B).
82 Carson, 2011 WL 5101701 at *4 (citations omitted).
a 28 USC § 1603(b)(2).
8 Connecticut National Bank v Germain, 503 US 249, 254 (1992). See also Barnhart
v Sigmon Coal Company, 534 US 438, 450 (2002) ("The [statutory construction] inquiry
ceases if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent
and consistent.") (quotation marks and citations omitted).
85 See Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company v Union Planters Bank, NA, 530
US 1, 6 (2000) ("[Wlhen the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts-at
least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd-is to enforce it according to
its terms.") (quotation marks and citations omitted).
86 Burlington Northern Railroad Company v Oklahoma Tax Commission, 481 US
454, 461 (1987).
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"instrumentality" reference in the FCPA. For instance, in Bur-

lington Northern Railroad Company v Oklahoma Tax Commission,87 the respondents attempted to show that a statute's reference to "true market value" should be interpreted as meaning
"state determined market value."8 8 Although the statute placed
the burden of proof on the state to show true market value, the
respondents contended that the issue could not be litigated in
federal court at all.89 The Court held that it would be illogical for
a statute to place the burden of proof on one party when that
very party had the power to determine that issue. Therefore, the
Court found the language to be unambiguous and cited to numerous provisions of the statute that buttressed its conclusion. 90
In other cases, the Court has employed legislative history
when an examination of a statute's text provides only modest
support for an interpretation. For instance, the Court looked to
legislative history in Gustafson v Alloyd Company91 when interpreting a provision of the federal securities laws. The Court held
that the statutory language at issue only applied to primary
transactions, not private, secondary transactions. The Court's
holding relied on a number of statutory construction doctrines. 92
The Court noted that, in coming to its holding, legislative history
proved "[o]f equal importance," and it cited to a Senate report on
the legislation that grouped primary and secondary transactions
together. 93 The Court's reliance on legislative history appeared
justified because the statute itself did not directly address
whether its provisions applied only to primary purchasers or to
primary and secondary purchasers.
2. These precedents indicate that legislative history is appropriate for interpreting the FCPA.
Given this case law, the FCPA lacks sufficient textual guidance to determine clearly the meaning of "instrumentality." The
FCPA does not, for instance, contain any provisions concerning
the burden of proof (or any other aspects) of the instrumentality
87 481 US 454 (1987).
88 Id at 455.
89 Id at 462.
90 Id at 461-62.
91 513 US 561 (1995).
92 These included interpreting a provision in light of the entire act; giving the same

meaning to the same word in an entire act; and the doctrine of noscitur a sociis. Id at 570,
572-73.
9 Id at 577.
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issue that a court could use to extrapolate its meaning, as the
Court did in Burlington Northern. The FCPA's legislative history
directly addresses the question of what sorts of entities it covers-and because it addresses the question head-on and frequently, a court would be likely to use that legislative history in
statutory interpretation. 94 As in Gustafson, the FCPA does not
explicitly state what entities would fall under the definition of a
government instrumentality, and this omission calls for the use
of legislative history.
Therefore, in contrast to the holding of Carson, the term "instrumentality" is not "clear," nor is "the statutory scheme ...
coherent and consistent."95 Such an argument fails, given the
definitions of other terms within the FCPA and the definition of
"instrumentality" in the FSIA. Further, a court should not rely
on the FSIA's definition of instrumentality as a placeholder for
the FCPA's missing definition of instrumentality, since the two
statutes were not drafted together and deal with separate issues. 96
The most useful legislative history sources for courts are
"documents prepared by Congress when deliberating."9 7 The
Court has relied on statements made in congressional hearings
by proponents of the legislation, and it has even cited to the
views of witnesses who are not members of Congress but who
helped draft the legislation and testified in favor of the legislation at congressional hearings.9 8 Indeed, the Court once called a
congressional witness's testimony "[t]he most relevant exposition
of the provision," deemed his description "significant," and used
his testimony to help divine "the intent" of Congress. 9 Courts,
then, can use testimony from congressional witnesses, including
congressmen, to illuminate the intended meaning of statutory
94 See Chamber of Commerce v Whiting, 131 S Ct 1968, 1980 (2011) (noting that the
argument against using legislative history was "particularly compelling" where only one
legislative document discussed the clause at issue, despite the existence of four House
reports, a Senate report, and a conference committee report on the legislation).
9 Carson,2011 WL 5101701 at *8.
96 See Russello v United States, 464 US 16, 25 (1983) ("Language in one statute usually sheds little light upon the meaning of different language in another statute, even
when the two are enacted at or about the same time.").
97 Gustafson, 513 US at 580. The Gustafson opinion cited to a House committee report.
98 See, for example, Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder, 425 US 185, 202-03 (1976), citing
Hearings on HR 7852 and HR 8720 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 73d Cong, 2d Sess 115 (1934) (testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran, counsel with
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation).
9 Hochfelder, 425 US at 202-03.
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language that is not clear on its face, including the types of
sources on which this Comment relies.100
B. The Legislative History of Private Bribery Reinforces Congress's Emphasis on Discretionary Government Power
A court could use the legislative history concerning private
bribery as proof that Congress did not outlaw such practices in
the FCPA.10 Because Congress did not outlaw foreign bribery in
totality, it has indicated that the level of government influence
on the entity is pivotal to the "instrumentality" inquiry.
In the FCPA realm, Congress's decision not to outlaw bribery of private corporations is vital to understanding the FCPA's
purpose. Judicial precedents indicate that Congress's failure to
outlaw one practice in a statute that eventually passes can provide guidance in statutory interpretation. For instance, an agency's interpretation of a regulation can receive implicit congressional approval when multiple legislative proposals to alter it
have failed, Congress has passed other alterations to the statute,
and Congress has held "[e]xhaustive hearings" on the interpretation. 102 The failure to legislate over an interpretation may indicate to a court that Congress approved of such interpretation
when "Congress-and in this setting, any Member of Congresswas. . . abundantly aware of what was going on." 10 3
In addition, a failure to legislate can codify the existing legal

regime at issue. In FDA v Brown & Williamson Tobacco,10 4 the
Court held that the FDA did not have congressional authorization to regulate tobacco products. 0 5 Congress had enacted a
number of bills concerning "tobacco and health, creating a distinct regulatory scheme for cigarettes and smokeless tobacco,"

1oo See id at 203 (taking a congressional witness's description of a statutory section as
a "catchall ... to deal with new manipulative (or cunning) devices" as support for the
Court's holding that Congress did not intend to criminalize negligence).
101 See Part IA.

102 Bob Jones University v United States, 461 US 574, 600 (1983).
103 Id at 600-01. See also Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v US Army
Corps of Engineers, 531 US 159, 169 n 5 (2001) (finding that Congress's failure to overrule an agency interpretation implies congressional ratification of an interpretation that
goes against the "plain text and original understanding" only when there is "overwhelming evidence of acquiescence," such as when the agency interpretation is correct, all members of Congress knew about the interpretation, and many bills had been introduced and
had failed on the subject).
104 529 US 120 (2000).
105 See id at 156.
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with actual knowledge of the dangers of tobacco. 0 6 The FDA had
consistently stated it lacked authority to regulate tobacco and
Congress had acted to "preclude a meaningful role for any administrative agency" in policymaking on the subject.10 7 The
Court held that the failure to grant specific jurisdiction to the
FDA to regulate tobacco meant that Congress affirmatively intended the FDA to lack such authority.108
However, the Court has cautioned that "unsuccessful attempts at legislation are not the best of guides to legislative intent."109 For instance, a failure to pass a bill outlawing an agency
interpretation of the law does not imply Congress's "acquiescence" to that interpretation, in part because "[a] bill can be proposed for any number of reasons, and it can be rejected for just
as many others."1 10
The failure to outlaw private bribery in the FCPA, though,
accords with the Court's holding in Brown & Williamson Tobacco, because the reason for not outlawing private bribery was
clear. The FCPA hearings consistently noted the existence of private bribery, that many legislators and experts in the field disapproved of it, and-crucially-the fact that the FCPA would not
outlaw it. This is not a case where a standalone bill to outlaw an
agency interpretation fails and a litigant claims that its failure
implies congressional approval of that interpretation. Instead,
Congress specifically desired to keep such payments out of the
FCPA's purview. As in Brown & Williamson Tobacco, courts
could interpret the failure to do so as an indication of legislative
intent.
III. SOLVING THE "INSTRUMENTALITY" PROBLEM WITH A
CONTROL ANALYSIS

In this Part, I first argue that other commentators' conclusions about the term "instrumentality" lack justification because
they fail to use legislative history sufficiently. I next argue that a
"control analysis," which would focus on the effect of a bribe on
its recipient, is the ideal method to interpret the phrase given
Id at 155.
Id at 156 (emphasis in original). Such considerations may be less important for
criminal laws, as there can be no prosecution in the absence of positive law criminalizing
conduct.
1os Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 US at 156.
09 Red Lion BroadcastingCo v FCC, 395 US 367, 381 n 11 (1969).
"0 Solid Waste Agency, 531 US at 170.
106
107
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the FCPA's legislative history. In the past, courts have employed
some irrelevant factors in decisions concerning the "instrumentality" definition.
A.

Other Commentators' Responses Fail to Provide a Principled
Guide to Interpreting the FCPA

The definition of "instrumentality" has been the subject of
academic debate, with some commentators arguing that the
FCPA needs legislative revision in order to clarify what entities
fall under the definition of instrumentality.11 1 Such a solution,
however, leaves unanswered the question of what entities fall
under the FCPA's current definition.
The authors of an article in The Business Lawyer urged the
DOJ and SEC to define instrumentality synonymously with the
OECD's definition of "public enterprise" in the Anti-Bribery Convention, which went into effect in 1999.112 The OECD defines a
public enterprise as one "over which a government may exercise
a dominant influence directly or indirectly" or one "in which the
government holds a majority stake." 113 The authors of The Business Lawyer article argued that only employees of a foreign company "who perform a public function" should be considered foreign officials. 1 14 The article's authors also argued that employees
of a company that is "substantially equivalent to that of a private
enterprise" should not be considered foreign officials. 15 Finally,
the authors suggested that if a control test is used, the entity
should only be considered an instrumentality if the foreign government exercises a "dominant influence" over the entity. 116

"I See, for example, Jacqueline L. Bonneau, Note, CombatingForeign Bribery: Legislative Reform in the United Kingdom and Prospects for Increased Global Enforcement, 49
Colum J Transnatl L 365, 399 (2011). Because of the high rate of settlements, there has
been relatively little judicial commentary on the meaning of "instrumentality." See note
10 and accompanying text.
112 Cohen, Holland, and Wolf, 63 Bus Law at 1270, 1259 (cited in note 10). See also
Eric J. Smith, Comment, Resolving Ambiguity in the FCPA Through Compliance with the
OECD Convention on Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, 27 Md J Intl L 377 (2012). The
OECD includes thirty-four member nations, including the US. For a list of all OECD
members, see http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners (visited Sept 10, 2012).
113 OECD, Corruption: A Glossary of International Criminal Standards 32 (OECD
2008).
114 Cohen, Holland, and Wolf, 63 Bus Law at 1270 (cited in note 10) (quotation marks
and citation omitted).
115 Id. This suggestion would seem to violate the text of the FCPA, however, foreign
governments may run entities that in the US would be privately held, such as telephone
companies.
116 Id at 1271.
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While their proposal coincides in part with this Comment's
conclusion, the authors drew the "public function" language from
the OECD definition. 117 Because the OECD convention went into
effect in 1999, it is illogical to argue that Congress intended to
codify such a definition in the FCPA, which was enacted in 1977.
The authors reasoned that adopting OECD definitions would
harmonize US law with other nations' anticorruption laws and
would help businesses conduct due diligence and alter their behavior to be more certain that they would avoid government
prosecutions.1 1 8 Though harmonization may be desirable, it is not
an excuse for failing to examine the intentions of the statute's
drafters. The authors do not justify their suggestions by examining legislative history in depth; instead, they rely mainly on DOJ
and SEC opinions.119 While executive branch opinions may be
persuasive given the low level of judicial commentary in the field,
they may be a biased source from which to draw conclusions
about statutory interpretation. 120
One commentator, Agnieszka Klich, has argued that a control analysis should determine whether an entity is an instrumentality under the FCPA. 121 An "ownership" analysis determines that an entity is an instrumentality by analyzing the percentage of government ownership, while a "control" analysis considers the degree of control that the government exercises over
the entity. Klich analyzed former Soviet bloc economies that
were transitioning from state ownership to private control, and
she suggested that one way to determine if an entity is an instrumentality is to analyze the percentage of government equity
ownership of the entity. Klich relied on an April 1993 DOJ release concerning post-Communist economies that suggested an
entity was an instrumentality if the government either "operate[d]" the enterprise or owned over half of the shares of the corporation and all the shares were voting. 122 As previously dis117 See id at 1260.

s18Cohen, Holland, and Wolf, 63 Bus Law at 1269-70 (cited in note 10).
119 See, for example, id at 1253 n 39, citing DOJ, Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct Review: Opinion Procedure, Release 94-01 (May 13, 1994), online at http://www.justice.gov/
criminallfraud/fcpa/opinion/1994/9401.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012).
120 For instance, the Supreme Court has recognized, "We need accept only those agency interpretations that are reasonable in light of the principles of construction courts
normally employ." Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, 130 S Ct 2869, 2887 (2010)
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
121 See Agnieszka Klich, Note, Bribery in Economies in Transition: The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 32 Stan J Intl L 121, 134-35 (1996).
122 Id at 136.
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cussed, the FSIA relies on an ownership analysis to determine if
an entity is an instrumentality.
Klich suggested that a "control" analysis more accurately reflects the purpose of the FCPA than an "ownership" analysis. 123
She argued that the purpose of outlawing public institution bribery was "the implicit belief" that it "undermines the legitimacy of
the state"; legitimacy can only be affected if the state exercises
control, not if it simply owns a portion of the entity on paper. 124
However, Klich relied on only one statement from Dr. Gordon
Adams, a witness at a congressional hearing, in an attempt to
determine the purpose of the FCPA. 125 Instead, she relied extensively on post-enactment sources, 126 which a court would be unlikely to give much weight. 127
B.

Government Control Should Be the Defining Characteristic
of an FCPA Instrumentality
1. The legislative history suggests that some governmentinfluenced corporations are "instrumentalities" under the
FCPA.

The foregoing discussion makes clear that members of Congress intended the FCPA to encompass bribes to a wide range of
entities. The FCPA carves out exceptions to this broad statuteexplicitly, through the grease payment exception, and implicitly,
by not outlawing bribery to purely private corporations. A comprehensive "instrumentality" definition, therefore, must include
some government-influenced corporations. The text of the statute
does not exempt bribes of government-influenced corporations.
As a result, the fact that an entity is merely deemed a "corporation" by foreign law cannot by itself preclude it from being a government instrumentality, agency, or department.
123 Id at 138.
124 Id.

125 Klich, Note, 32 Stan J Intl L at 135 nn 74, 75 (cited in note 121). The discussion of
Dr. Adams' testimony only comprises two paragraphs of the Klich Note. Other citations to
legislative sources concern the details of the FCPA's prohibitions; Klich did not use them
to try to divine legislative intent. See id at 125 n 26 (discussing the grease payment exception); id at 139 nn 92, 93 (discussing the "corrupt" requirement).
126 See, for example, id at 138 n 88 (looking to a DOJ release from 1993).
127 The Supreme Court has indicated that even post-enactment legislative history is
disfavored; post-enactment opinions of the executive branch are less illuminating concerning the FCPA drafters' intentions. See Hagen v Utah, 510 US 399, 420 (1994) ("[Tjhe
views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an
earlier one.") (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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2. Government control is the only way to harmonize the
FCPA's prohibitions with the legality of private bribery.
Courts should adopt an inquiry that focuses on the degree of
control that the government exercises over the entity, not simply
an analysis of the percentage of the company's equity owned by
the government. This "control analysis" is the correct interpretation because the FCPA's legislative history emphasizes the possibility of corruption of senior-level government officials, not lowlevel functionaries. 128 A control analysis is a logical corollary to
the grease payment exception, which derived from the original
allowance for bribery of low-level government officials. By consulting legislative history, we can understand the legislative intent behind the grease payment exception: the FCPA only intended to target bribes when those bribes could affect a government official's discretionary functions. The FCPA was designed
to target the misuse of an official's discretionary power. If a government does not control an institution, a government official
cannot misuse discretionary power when a member of the institution receives a bribe.
This "control analysis" would require a fact-finder to determine if the entity was more independent of the government than
not and whether a bribe to that entity was more likely than not
to have repercussions on a government official's wielding discretionary power. Given the FCPA's legislative history, this inquiry
is the most logical interpretation of "instrumentality." Yet courts
have so far been reluctant to articulate such a test in FCPA cases
concerning the instrumentality definition. This failure is understandable given their reluctance to consult legislative history.12 9
3. Judicial interpretations of "instrumentality" have in part
relied on mistaken factors in their analyses.
The Carson court comes the closest to embracing the "control
analysis," although it did not consult legislative history in its
opinion. 130 The legislative history that this Comment has explored shows that the test laid out in Carson would, as least in
part, help courts interpret the FCPA as Congress had originally
intended. In particular, Carson's focus on the nation's "degree of
control over the entity"; the entity's "obligations and privileges";
128 See note 39 and accompanying text. See also Part IA.
129 See, for example, Aguilar, 783 F Supp 2d at 1119.
130 See Carson, 2011 WL 5101701 at *3-4.
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how the entity was created; and the extent of the government's
ownership of the entity are all relevant to determining the level
of control that the government retains over the entity. 13 1 These
factors would help courts determine the potential for corruption
of high-level government officials with discretionary power.132
These factors deal with the power that the government exercises
over the entity, as well as the direct benefits that the government receives from the entity's work. As these factors tilt toward
government control, the risk that a bribe to the entity could influence a government official with discretionary power increases.
However, two Carson factors are irrelevant. First, the court
noted that how the nation characterizes the entity could be relevant. 133 Yet a nation could characterize an entity as a private
corporation and still wield exclusive power over its activities.
Certainly, the legislative history does not indicate that a government-owned entity that could be influenced by US-based
bribery would be immune from that influence because the government calls it a private corporation. Second, the court stated
that the entity's purpose could be relevant. 134 However, the text
of the legislation does not include any mention of the purpose of
a government agency, department, instrumentality, or public
international organization. Indeed, an entity's purpose does not
bear on the corrupting effect bribes would have on foreign officials.
Carson'sreliance on "purpose" factors into its statement that
an entity can be an instrumentality if a government invests in it
and there are "additional factors that objectively indicate the
13 5
entity is being used . . . to carry out governmental objectives."

A government's goal to achieve a particular policy should not
matter in an FCPA instrumentality analysis. To illustrate, a
government could wish to see its citizens purchase homes. Yet a
government's support of mortgage lenders (through subsidies,
say) is irrelevant to the question of whether bribery of the officials of the mortgage lender would have a corrupting influence on
those with discretionary governmental power. 136 The Carson
131 See id at *3.

132 See note 74 and accompanying text.
us See Carson, 2011 WL 5101701 at *3.
134 See id.
135 Id at *5.
136 It is conceivable that the government could be influenced by bribes to a mortgage

lender; the lender could funnel those bribes to the government official who wields the
purse strings, for instance. But the purpose of the entity, to lend to individuals, is irrele-
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court stated that, because of the US's "long history of using corporations to carry out governmental objectives," equivalent foreign entities could be instrumentalities under the FCPA.137 The
key factor in Carson's analogy, however, should be that the government "use[s]" the entity, not that the entity shares "objectives" with the government.' 3 8 Indeed, if a court determines that
a government uses an entity, it would likely be straightforward
to determine if the government also controls that entity.
For example, one can imagine an entity that promotes a government objective, is controlled by the government, and should
therefore fall under the FCPA's purview-for instance, if the
state created the entity and controlled its board of directors. But
the fact that the entity's purpose overlaps with a government's
policy objective seriously muddles the control analysis. Carson
thus enters dangerous territory when it delves into the purposes
of a particular entity instead of focusing on objective factors indicating government control.
IV. CONCLUSION
The legislative history of the FCPA indicates that it was
passed with the clear purpose of reducing bribes to foreign government-affiliated individuals. This purpose, evident in legislative hearings and revisions of provisions such as the grease payment exception, risks being undermined if courts read the FCPA
too broadly. An entity may seem to fall under the FCPA if it carries out a function that Americans view as belonging to the government. But if the entity is not controlled by a foreign government, any purpose it has is irrelevant to the effect of the bribery
on the foreign government. The FCPA's purpose, clearly stated in
the legislative history, is to target the misuse of a foreign official's government-provided discretionary power. Courts should,
therefore, determine if an entity is an instrumentality under the
FCPA by examining the control that a foreign government has
over that entity.

vant to the FCPA inquiry.
137 See Carson, 2011 WL 5101701 at *6.
138 See id.
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